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We study the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policies in an open
economy. We emphasize two transmission mechanisms: the cost chan-
nel, by which wage government spending and labor taxes raise the real
wage ﬁrms must pay, and the exchange rate channel, by which the
nominal exchange rate shifts induced by ﬁs c a lp o l i c yh a v er e a le ﬀects
if (some) prices and wages are sticky. The latter channel implies that
changes in wage government spending or in labor taxation should have
diﬀerent eﬀects under ﬂexible than under ﬁxed exchange rates. In a
1964-93 panel of OECD countries we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for both
channels. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the real product wage and proﬁtabil-
ity are more responsive than quantities (employment and output) to
ﬁscal policy innovations.
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Abstract
We study the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policies in an open economy.
We emphasize two transmission mechanisms: the cost channel, by which wage
government spending and labor taxes raise the real wage ﬁrms must pay, and
the exchange rate channel, by which the nominal exchange rate shifts induced by
ﬁs c a lp o l i c yh a v er e a le ﬀects if (some) prices and wages are sticky. The latter
channel implies that changes in wage government spending or in labor taxation
should have diﬀerent eﬀects under ﬂexible than under ﬁxed exchange rates. In a
1964-93 panel of OECD countries we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence for both channels.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the real product wage and proﬁtability are more responsive
than quantities (employment and output) to ﬁscal policy innovations.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we study the short-run macroeconomic eﬀects of shifts in ﬁscal
policy in an open economy. We are especially interested in two questions.
One is the importance of the composition of a given movement in ﬁscal
p o l i c y .T h eo t h e ri sw h e t h e rt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m em a k e sad i ﬀerence in
the transmission of ﬁscal policy.
Research on recent ﬁscal consolidations in the OECD has highlighted the
importance of composition in the success and persistence of ﬁscal reforms. As
argued by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and formalized by Bertola and Drazen
(1993), the consolidations in Denmark and Ireland in the mid-1980s were
associated with a macroeconomic boom, rather than a recession, because they
were mainly based on expenditure cuts rather than tax increases. Alesina and
Perotti (1995, 1997a) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) show that, controlling
for the size of the budget deﬁcit reduction, those adjustments that were
implemented by cutting government transfers and public wages have been
much more persistent than those achieved by increasing taxes.
1One reason the composition of a ﬁscal reform may be important is that it
matters for the macroeconomic eﬀects of a shift in ﬁscal policy. We start from
the simple observation that, to diﬀerent degrees, all industrialized countries
are open economies: therefore, an understanding of how ﬁscal policy aﬀects
the tradable (here, manufacturing) sector is crucial for an understanding
of the overall macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. We consider four key
indicators of the performance of the tradable sector: employment, output,
the real product wage, and proﬁtability.
Our focus on these variables is motivated by the observation that the
labor market is a key channel by which ﬁscal policy movements aﬀect the
non-government sectors of the economy. Even if the tradable sector does not
rely on the domestic economy as a source of ﬁnal demand, it must compete
with the non-traded sector (including the government sector) for non-traded
factors such as labor. For instance, an increase in government employment
or wages shifts out the aggregate demand for labor and causes upward pres-
sure on economy-wide wages. Similarly, the workings of the labor market
determine the extent to which increases in labor taxes are shifted onto ﬁrms
in the form of higher pre-tax wages. In turn, higher labor costs induce ﬁrms
to scale back the levels of employment and output and depress proﬁtabil-
ity. This cost channel is a primary mechanism by which ﬁscal policy aﬀects
the performance even of sectors that sell exclusively to foreign customers
and hence are insulated from the level of aggregate demand in the domestic
economy.
I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fs t i c k yp r i c e so rw a g e s ,ﬁscal policy aﬀects macroeco-
nomic performance via a second channel, the exchange rate channel.F o r
instance, an increase in government spending that generates nominal ap-
preciation hurts the proﬁtability of ﬁrms in the traded sector if they face
exogenous foreign currency prices and domestic nominal wages are not fully
ﬂexible. We investigate this issue formally by conditioning responses to ﬁscal
policy shifts on the exchange rate regime in place in each country in each
time period.1
We construct a panel data set of up to seventeen OECD countries for the
1At the level of casual empiricism, many economists and policy-makers have argued
that devaluation was an essential ingredient in the success of the 1987 Irish ﬁscal consoli-
dation (see e.g. Alogoskouﬁs( 1992) for an exposition of this view). Similarly, it is widely
believed that the 1992 devaluations in the UK and Italy had a large positive impact on the
international competitiveness of ﬁrms in those countries (see e.g. European Commission
(1994)).
2period 1964-1993. In studying the composition of ﬁscal policy, we concentrate
on government spending on goods and services on the expenditure side, and
distinguish between its wage and non-wage components. On the revenues
side, we consider labor taxation (i.e. personal income taxes, social security
taxes, and payroll taxes). We show that the distinction between the various
parts of the budget turns out to be crucial. Previewing our empirical results,
the most important ﬁnding is that increases in wage government spending
on goods and services raise the real product wage and depress proﬁtability
in the traded sector. Moreover, the eﬀects on the real wage and proﬁtability
are signiﬁcantly larger under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. With a few
exceptions, that we note in due course, these and other results are consistent
with the model of partial wage and price stickiness that we present in section
2b e l o w .
To the best of our knowledge, the previous open-economy literature has
not emphasized the composition eﬀects of ﬁscal policy or jointly examined
the cost and exchange rate channels. A number of papers are antecendents
to various aspects of our contribution. Helpman (1976 and 1977) studies
the crowding out eﬀect of government spending in the non-traded sector on
the level of production in the traded sector. De Gregorio, Giovannini and
Wolf (1994) and Froot and Rogoﬀ (1991) ﬁnd evidence that the level of
aggregate government consumption inﬂuences the relative price of tradables
to nontradables. Alesina and Perotti (1997b) study empirically the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy on relative unit labor costs, and the dependence of these eﬀects
on the degree of unionization of labor markets. Mendoza and Tesar (1998)
emphasize the supply side eﬀects of tax policies in open economies. Frenkel,
Razin and Yuen (1996) focus on the ﬁscal deﬁcit, and study theoretically
wealth and intertemporal substitution eﬀects in the context of a two-country,
two-period model. Stockman and Ohanian (1993) also write a model with
partial ﬂexibility.
Finally, we note that our results on the open-economy dimension are
complementary to other empirical studies on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. In
panel regressions on a similar sample to that used here, Giavazzi and Pagano
(1996), Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (1998), and Perotti (1999) investigate
the response of private consumption to changes in various components of the
government budget; Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (1999) study
the response of investment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. As a foundation for the empirical
work, section 2 presents a simple model of ﬁscal policy in an open economy,
3formalizing the cost and the exchange rate channels discussed above. Section
3 develops the solution of the model under full price and wage ﬂexibility ﬁrst
and then under price and wage stickiness. Section 4 discusses the data and
the econometric speciﬁcation. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while
section 6 discusses their robustness: the relevant tables for this robustness
exercise can be found on this journal’s web site.2 Section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
The traditional Mundell-Fleming model is not well equipped to deal with
the main points we wish to emphasize. In the presence of full price rigidity,
supply-side factors are unimportant in the short-run since it is assumed that
the level of demand determines output. In that environment, ﬁscal policy
(government spending or taxation) only operates via an aggregate demand
channel. Moreover, for a small open economy that sells all its output on
international markets at ﬁxed world prices, the level of domestic demand
is irrelevant for output and only aﬀects the trade balance. A two-sector
version of the Mundell-Fleming model that distinguishes between nontraded
and traded goods does allow a demand channel even for a small economy:
government spending on nontradables has an expansionary eﬀect on that
sector. However, the supply-side channel remains absent.
In what follows, we propose a two-sector model that allows ﬁscal policy to
have an impact on supply conditions but retains suﬃcient nominal rigidities
that the exchange rate regime matters for the transmission of ﬁscal policy.
For realism, we model a non-traded non-market government sector as using
labour to produce goods for its own consumption; thus, an increase in gov-
ernment wage consumption has a demand eﬀect by raising the government’s
and therefore total labor demand. The other sector consists of private ﬁrms
that employ labour to produce goods that are sold on world markets. These
ﬁrms possess some market power (demand curves are downward-sloping) but
local demand conditions are unimportant: home consumers are a negligible
fraction of world demand. Fiscal policies aﬀect this sector via a supply chan-
nel – changes in government employment or labor taxes aﬀect real wages
– and via the nominal exchange rate, in the case of a ﬂoating exchange rate
system and partial nominal rigidities.
2http://www.elsevier.com/homepage/sae/econbase/pubec/.
4More formally, we model an open economy in which domestic private
ﬁrms sell their output on world markets. The home economy is small: for
simplicity we make the extreme – and standard – assumption that domestic
consumers have zero impact on the levels of demand for domestic or foreign
traded products. Firms have monopolistic power in the market for the good
they produce and thereby face downward-sloping demand schedules: hence,
if cost pressures force a price increase, output and employment decline. For
simplicity, we present the model in the case of a generic downward sloping
demand function and a generic upward sloping labor supply function.3
As was discussed in the introduction, we focus on three ﬁscal policy in-
struments: the wage and the non-wage components of government spending
on goods and services, and taxes on labor.4 In modelling wage government
spending, our assumption is that the government announces it will hire Lg
workers. In order to avoid modelling a segmented labor market, we assume
that the government hires from an integrated labor pool and the average wage
prevails in both the private and public sectors. The wage is determined by the
equilibrium in the labor market: hence, in formulating its budgetary policy,
the government takes into account the impact of an increase in government
employment on the wage rate and hence on its total expenditure. Non-wage
government spending falls mostly on privately-produced goods, and there-
fore in our model it would have no eﬀects on aggregate labor demand, the
wage, and costs since domestic demand is only a negligible component of ﬁnal
demand in an open economy. In a richer model, that includes for instance
also a private non-tradables sector,5 non-wage government spending could
have similar eﬀects on labor demand as wage government spending if it were
biased toward non-tradables.6 This is essentially an empirical question and
we thereby allow a role for nonwage government spending in our empirical
work. Finally, for simplicity, we model labor taxes as a linear tax rate τ on
the wage W.
3In an earlier working paper version, we presented an explicit solution in the case of mo-
nopolistic competition with constant elasticity of substitution among diﬀerent goods, and
with an upward-sloping labor supply function derived from the equilibrium in a unionized
labor market.
4Since our ﬁscal channels would operate even in a dynamic model that exhibits Ri-
cardian equivalence, we are concerned with the direct eﬀects of government spending and
taxation policies rather than any impact via the levels of the ﬁscal deﬁcit and public debt.
5Recall that we already have a non-traded sector in our model, the government sector.
6See for instance Helpman (1976) and Frenkel, Razin and Yuen (1996).
5Output is produced using only labor in both the private sector and the
government sector (the latter identiﬁed by the subscript “g”):
Y = R(L); Yg = Lg (1)
where the ﬁrst and second derivatives are R1 > 0 and R11 ≥ 0.7 We denote
total employment – the sum of private and government employment – as









F1 > 0 (2)
where S is the exchange rate, expressed as units of domestic currencies per
unit of foreign currency (so that an increase in S represents a depreciation
of the domestic currency). Note that S is also the CPI, since the composite
consumption good is imported and its exogenous foreign currency price is
normalized to 1.8 Thus, (2) says that aggregate labor supply is an increasing
function of the real after-tax consumption wage. If we think of labor supply as
being controlled by unions (as for instance in Alesina and Perotti (1997b) or
in a previous version of this paper), the elasticity of labor supply embodied in
the F() function is a reduced-form aggregate concept, rather than reﬂecting
an individual agent’s labor supply elasticity.9
Given the single-factor production technology, labor demand in the pri-
vate sector is driven by the foreign demand for private domestic output:10
L
d = G(P
∗) G1 < 0 (3)
where P∗ is the price, in foreign currency, of tradable goods produced at
home (which, under our assumptions, are all exported). Thus, we model the
product market as imperfectly competitive: the higher is P ∗,t h el o w e ri s
output demand and hence the level of employment.
7R11 =0corresponds to the constant returns case. R11 > 0 implies the presence of
increasing returns. For instance, increasing returns may be present if production requires
a ﬁxed labor input in addition to a variable labor input.
8We assume the CPI excludes government goods whose implicit price is given by the
level of government wages.
9We adopt a general speciﬁcation for the labor supply function, since our results do
not depend on the presence of labor unions.
10Let output demand be Y d = J(P∗),J 1 < 0. It follows that labor demand is Ld =
R−1[J(P∗)] = G(P∗).
6Export prices are set in buyers’ currency and are a positive function of
the marginal cost, also expressed in foreign currency. In this model with one
factor, the marginal cost is equal to labor compensation W(1 + v), i.e. the
wage paid to the employee plus any labor tax paid by the employer. The
eﬀects of an increase in the labor tax paid by the employer v are qualitatively
identical to those of an increase in τ. For this reason and to simplify the
notation, we assume v =0from now on, and do not distinguish explicitly








H1 > 0 (4)
The function H() is linear in the monopolistic competition case but we could
allow H11 < 0 also. This would be the case if ﬁrms were reluctant to fully
pass on cost increases to consumers. For instance, in the customer-loyalty
model of Phelps (1994), ﬁr m sd on o tf u l l yp a s so nc o s t si n c r e a s e ss i n c ear i s e
in price increase has a negative impact on market share.11
As it is standard, we assume the money supply is held ﬁxed under a
ﬂoating exchange rate regime. Accordingly, the exchange rate is determined
by money demand, and therefore by domestic real GDP Q ( a si ti st h ec a s e
in any transactions-based theory of money demand). We assume velocity is
ﬁxed: an increase in GDP increases the transactions demand for money and
hence causes an appreciation of the exchange rate
S = V (Q) V1 < 0 (5)







3T h e e ﬀects of ﬁscal policy
We can now discuss the eﬀects of changes in government spending or taxes on
output, employment, costs, the exchange rate and proﬁtability in the traded
sector.
11Alternatively, as in Ball and Romer (1990), such real rigidity may arise from imper-
fect information that makes existing customers more responsive to price increases than
prospective new customers are to price decreases.
73.1 Measures of cost and proﬁtability
We consider two measures of costs and proﬁts: the real product wage ω and
“proﬁtability” π, as measured by the ratio of the output price to unit labor













Note that the real product wage thus deﬁned is just the inverse of the mark-
up of the price on the marginal cost.
Now let unit labor costs in the private sector be the ratio of nominal labor
costs (in the foreign currency) to real value added: ULC = WL/SY.W e









When P∗ is the value added deﬂator, this deﬁnition of proﬁtability is equiv-
alent to the inverse of the proﬁt share in value added. Also, under constant
returns (Y proportional to L), P∗/ULC is proportional to the markup, hence
it is proportional to the inverse of the real product wage.
3.2 Flexible wages and prices
As a benchmark, we now work out the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on relative prices,
wages, employment, and output in the case of perfectly ﬂexible domestic
prices and wages; in the next subsection, we allow for partial stickiness in
prices and wages.
Because the real consumption wage is equal to the marginal cost, for
illustrative purposes it is useful to start from the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on
the real consumption wage; this and the markup will determine the eﬀects
on the output price, hence on output and employment, hence on the real
product wage and proﬁtability.
12Note the diﬀerence with the real consumption wage, which is the ratio of the nominal
wage to the consumer price index S.
13This is a widely used measure of proﬁtability in international comparisons. Note that
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks would be the same if we used an alternative deﬁnition of
proﬁtability, like operating proﬁts divided by the capital stock.
8An increase in Lg raises total labor demand; from equation (2), for labor
supply to increase and match the extra labor demand, the real after-tax
consumption wage must increase; hence, for a given τ, the real consumption
wage W/S must increase. In addition, from equation (2), if the labor tax rate
τ increases, the real consumption wage W/S must increase to compensate
for the higher tax rate. Letting a tilde ‘ e ’ denote the equilibrium value of a




q1 > 0 (9)
Now consider the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on prices, output and employment.
>From (4), the real price P∗ is a mark-up over the real consumption wage
W/S. We have just shown that the real consumption wage increases when
Lg or τ increase. Hence:




= Λ(Lg,τ) Λ1 > 0; Λ2 > 0 (10)
Thus, when Lg or τ increase, the real price f P∗ also increases. Because do-
mestic ﬁrms face a downward sloping demand for exports, private output
and therefore private employment fall:
Y = γ(Lg,τ) γ1 < 0; γ2 < 0 (11)
Hence, the real consumption wage, the real output price, employment, and
real output are all independent of S; as a consequence, the eﬀects of ﬁscal
shocks on these variables are independent of the exchange rate regime.
If H11 =0 , as in monopolistic competition, the real product wage is
independent of W/S.I fH11 < 0, as for instance in the Phelps model, then the
real price f P∗ increases less than the real consumption wage; as a consequence,
the real product wage increases whenever W/S rises, for example in response
to either wage government spending or labor tax increases.
Under constant returns, the output/employment ratio Y/L is constant
and our measure of proﬁtability, P∗/ULC, is proportional to the inverse of
the real product wage; hence, an increase in wage government spending or
in labor taxes does not change proﬁtability if H11 =0 ;if instead H11 < 0,
the real product wage increases and proﬁtability falls when wage government
spending or labor taxation rise. Under increasing returns, regardless of the
9value of H11, the output/employment ratio Y/L falls as the real price f P∗
increases, hence proﬁtability falls.14
But what happens to the exchange rate S? The answer depends on what
happens to GDP. When Lg increases, we have seen that government value
added increases and private value added falls; in appendix A, we show that
the net eﬀect is that total GDP increases (for plausible parameter ranges)
and therefore the nominal exchange rate appreciates. The intuition is that
GDP will increase so long as the (negative) elasticity of the real wage with
respect to wage government consumption is not too large. This will be the
case when the size of the government sector is not too large and labor supply
and labor demand from private ﬁrms are not too inelastic. When τ increases,
government value added does not change, but we know from (11)t h a tp r i v a t e
value added falls; hence, total GDP unambiguously falls, and the exchange
rate depreciates.
In summary, we have shown that under the assumption of perfect wage
and price ﬂexibility all relevant quantities are just a function of the real
consumption wage W/S, and therefore they are independent of the exchange
rate S.T h ee ﬀects of ﬁscal policy are therefore independent of the exchange
rate regime. In addition, under constant returns to scale the real product
wage, the markup and proﬁtability are independent of ﬁscal policy if H11 =
0; if H11 < 0, in contrast, real consumption wage increases are not fully
passed through into prices and a ﬁscal expansion raises the real product
wage and depresses the markup and proﬁtability. Under increasing returns,
proﬁtability declines regardless of the value of H11; and it declines more than
in the constant returns to scale case, because the fall in output is associated
with a reduction in the output-labor ratio.
3.3 Nominal rigidities
To obtain a regime eﬀect, we now assume that both prices and wages are only
partially ﬂexible.15 A convenient formulation is to assume that a proportion
14Labor hoarding would have the same impact as increasing returns, with Y/L an in-
creasing function of Y . For brevity, we just use the term “increasing returns” in the
text.
15We do not strictly need that wages are subject to a nominal rigidity: all that is required
is that the nominal wage w does not move one-for-one with the nominal exchange rate S.
This can also be achieved if S had only a partial impact on the CPI due to the additional
consumption of, say, a nontraded good, and the relative price of the nontraded good falls
10λ of sectors set prices and wages in a ﬂexible manner and (1 − λ)s e tp r i c e s
and wages in advance of the realization of shocks. It follows that average
prices and wages follow the partial adjustment processes:
logP
∗ = λlog f P ∗ +( 1− λ)logP
∗
f (12)
logW = λlog f W +( 1− λ)logWf (13)
where P ∗
f and Wf are the predetermined values of prices and wages in “sticky”
sectors.16
Now consider what happens when wage government spending increases
unexpectedly, starting from an equilibrium situation where P ∗ = f P∗ and
W = f W. Again, conceptually it is useful to start from the eﬀect on the
real consumption wage and then follow the same logic as in the case of fully
ﬂexible wages and prices.
As labor demand increases, the nominal wage and the real consumption
wage must increase in the ﬂexible sectors. Starting from a situation of full
equilibrium and the same S in the two regimes, from (9) the eﬀect on the







since the nominal wage is free to adjust only in the ﬂexible sectors. Hence,






     
     
λ dlog( g W/S)
dlogLg
under f.e.r.
λ dlog( g W/S)
dlogLg





when S depreciates. For simplicity, we assume wages are partially sticky in order to avoid
having to introduce an extra consumption good into the analysis.
16We can think of these being set at optimal expected values before the realization of
shocks.
11In both regimes, there is upward pressure on the real consumption wage
that emanates from the ﬂexible sectors. Under ﬂoating exchange rates, there
is an additional eﬀect on average wages: the increase in Lg causes an ap-
preciation (a fall in S). In sectors where wages are sticky, the appreciation
means that real consumption wages rise and therefore a bigger increase in
the average real consumption wage W/S is observed under ﬂoating exchange
rates than under ﬁxed exchange rates. The ﬁrst term λ(dlog( g W/S)/dlogLg)
in equation (15), which is common to both regimes, is a fraction λ of the
eﬀect with perfectly ﬂexible prices and wages; hence, it is independent of
the exchange rate: we call it the cost channel of ﬁscal policy.17 The term
(λ − 1)(dlogS/dlogLg), which appears only under ﬂexible exchange rates,
represents the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy via the exchange rate: we call it the
exchange rate channel of ﬁscal policy.










where the pass-through coeﬃcient φ =1if H11 =0and 0 < φ < 1 if H11 < 0.
In ﬂexible sectors, the increase in real consumption wages that is induced by
the government spending expansion is (at least partially) passed through into
export prices.







where we assume a log-linear relation between price and output. Because
private output falls, private employment also falls. It is important to note
t h a tt h ed e c l i n ei no u t p u ta n de m p l o y m e n ti st h es a m ei nb o t he x c h a n g er a t e
regimes. The reason is that quantities are determined by the level of output
prices; output prices adjust to changes in ﬁscal policy only in ﬂexible sectors;
but these sectors also adjust fully to any change in the nominal exchange
rate, thus eliminating a regime eﬀect on quantities.
17Strictly speaking, ˜ w is not the same under partial price stickiness versus full price
stickiness, since wage increases are not fully passed into prices and hence output and labor
demand is less elastic with respect to wages. We ignore this minor complication.
12From equations (15) and (16), the eﬀect of a change in Lg on the average





     
     
(1 − φ)λ dlog( g W/S)
dlogLg
under f.e.r.
(1 − φ)λ dlog( g W/S)
dlogLg





Under ﬂexible exchange rates, the average real product wage increases more
than under ﬁxed exchange rate: the intuition is that the nominal exchange
rate appreciation under ﬂexible exchange rates pushes up the real product
wage in the sectors that do not adjust. Note that, as in equation (15), one
can also identify a cost channel and an exchange rate channel of ﬁscal policy
on proﬁtability in equation (18).
Under constants returns, from the formula for proﬁtability (equation (8)),
we have dlogπ/dlogLg = dlogP∗/dlogLg−dlog(W/S)/dlogLg. Therefore,
the change in average proﬁtability is just the opposite of the change in the
average real product wage: thus, proﬁtability falls more under ﬂexible ex-
change rates, as the nominal appreciation increases the marginal cost W/S
even in the sectors that do not adjust wages and prices. Under increasing
returns, the fall in proﬁtability is even larger since the output decline means
a fall in the output-labor ratio, compounding the negative eﬀect of a rise in
the real product wage.
The following table summarizes how the eﬀects of a change in Lg depend
on the degree of returns to scale and on the value of φ; the table also displays
the direction of the exchange rate regime eﬀe c to ne a c hv a r i a b l e( t h es u p e r -
scripts “F” and “P” indicate a ﬂexible and a pegged exchange rate regime,
respectively).
13Table I: eﬀects of an increase in Lg
φ =1 φ < 1
∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0 ∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0
∆LF = ∆LP < 0 ∆LF = ∆LP < 0
CRTS ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P =0 ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P =0
∆ωF = ∆ωP =0 ∆ωF > ∆ωP > 0
∆πF = ∆πP =0 ∆πF < ∆πP < 0
∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0 ∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0
∆LF = ∆LP < 0 ∆LF = ∆LP < 0
IRTS ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P < 0 ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P < 0
∆ωF = ∆ωP =0 ∆ωF > ∆ωP > 0
∆πF < ∆πP < 0 ∆πF < ∆πP < 0
“CRTS”: constant returns to scale; “IRTS”: increasing returns to scale.
φ =1 : complete pass through”; φ < 1: incomplete pass through.
The cost channel of labor taxation is similar. As taxes go up, imperfectly
elastic labor supply means that the real consumption wage W/S must rise.
As a result, prices increase, output and employment fall, the real product
wage rises and proﬁtability falls. The exchange rate channel, however, now
works in the opposite direction, since total GDP falls and therefore in a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime the exchange rate depreciates in response to
the tax hike. This depreciation dampens the increase in the product wage
and the fall in proﬁtability arising from an increase in labor taxes. As with
government employment, and for the same reasons, the eﬀect of a change in
labor taxes on private output and employment is independent of the exchange
rate regime. Table II summarizes the eﬀects of an increase in the tax rate,
depending on the value of φ and on the degrees of returns to scale.
14Table II: eﬀects of an increase in τ
φ =1 φ < 1
∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0 ∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0
∆LF = ∆LP < 0 ∆LF = ∆LP < 0
CRTS ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P =0 ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P =0
∆ωF = ∆ωP =0 ∆ωP > ∆ωF > 0
∆πF = ∆πP =0 ∆πP < ∆πF < 0
∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0 ∆Y F = ∆Y P < 0
∆LF = ∆LP < 0 ∆LF = ∆LP < 0
IRTS ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P < 0 ∆(Y/L)F = ∆(Y/L)P < 0
∆ωF = ∆ωP =0 ∆ωP > ∆ωF > 0
∆πP < ∆πF < 0 ∆πP < ∆πF < 0
In summary, our model predicts that an increase in wage government
spending raises the real wage and reduces proﬁtability in both exchange rate
regimes but that the eﬀect is bigger under ﬂexible exchange rates. Symmet-
rically, the model predicts that an increase in labor taxation will cause an
increase in the real product wage and a decline in proﬁtability but that the
eﬀect is stronger under pegged exchange rates. With respect to quantities,
an increase in wage government spending or labor taxation reduces output
and employment in the private tradable sector. Since the quantity response
is driven by the change in output prices, the output and employment eﬀects
are the same across exchange rate regimes.
3.4 Discussion and extensions
There are three important points to note about the model. First, we have as-
sumed that both prices and wages do not adjust fully to ﬁscal shocks. If only
prices were sticky, W/S would be independent of S and there would be no
exchange rate channel in the transmission of ﬁscal policy to real consumption
wages. With respect to proﬁtability and the real product wage, an exchange
rate channel would still operate even if wages were perfectly ﬂexible so long
as prices were partially sticky. However, if prices were fully rigid, there would
be no short-run output and employment eﬀects from ﬁscal policy since there
15would be no increase in prices and hence no decline in world demand for the
country’s exportables. If only wages were sticky, there would be no eﬀects
on output or proﬁtability under ﬁxed exchange rates, since the output price
would optimally adjust only to movements in the wage.18 Also, we have
made a sharp distinction between “ﬂexible” sectors in which both prices and
wages are ﬂexible and “rigid” sectors in which both are sticky. Other ways of
introducing partial rigidity could allow a diﬀerence in the quantity response
across exchange rate regimes. For example, in the case of a ﬂexible-price
ﬁrm dealing with sticky-wage workers, a nominal exchange rate depreciation
leads to a fall in the real wage paid by ﬁrms and hence induces a decline in
the output price. Again, we leave this open as an empirical matter.
Second, we assume ﬁrms preset prices in foreign currency units. If ex-
port prices were rather predetermined in terms of the domestic currency,
exchange rate ﬂuctuations would have no impact on the real product wage
and the markup: the export price in domestic currency, SP∗, which appears
in the numerator of (11), would be ﬁxed and hence insensitive to exchange
rate ﬂuctuations; similarly, under constant returns, proﬁtability would be
independent of the exchange rate. However, this case would also generate a
regime eﬀect in quantities, since foreign-currency prices (and hence export
sales) would now ﬂuctuate with the exchange rate. Consistent with Engel
(1999), the case we assume is empirically more relevant.
Third, the degree of ﬂexibility λ and the pass-through coeﬃcient φ in-
ﬂuence the magnitude of the eﬀe c t so fa ni n c r e a s ei nLg on quantities and
proﬁtability. With respect to the cost channel, the smaller is λ, the smaller
the eﬀects on the average output price and hence on quantities. A smaller
λ is also associated with a smaller increase in the average real consumption
w a g e ,s i n c ew ea s s u m et h es a m ed e g r e eo fﬂexibility in wages as in prices.
If φ < 1, the smaller also is the increase in the real product wage ω.W i t h
increasing returns, since the eﬀect on output and employment is smaller, so
is the fall in Y/L; because π =( Y/L)/ω, the negative eﬀect on proﬁtability is
also smaller when λ is smaller. With respect to the exchange rate channel, a
smaller λ magniﬁes the impact of exchange rates on proﬁtability by increas-
ing the degree of nominal rigidity. However, since a smaller λ also attenuates
t h eq u a n t i t yr e s p o n s et oﬁscal innovations, the magnitude of the change in
18Under ﬂexible exchange rates and sticky wages, nominal appreciation would lead to
a higher real wage, which ﬁrms would pass through into prices and hence output and
employment would fall.
16the exchange rate is diminished, which is an oﬀsetting eﬀect. In analysing
t h ec a s eo fa ni n c r e a s ei nt a x a t i o n ,v a r i a t i o ni nλ has similar eﬀects.19
4 The data and speciﬁcation
We test our model on a panel of yearly data, covering between fourteen (in
the high-quality sample) and seventeen (in the largest sample) countries.20
The data extend over the 1964-93 period in all countries in the high-quality
sample, with the exceptions of Denmark (starting date 1967), France (ending
date 1992) and Norway (starting date 1966 and ending date 1991); we also
exclude the years after 1989 in Germany because of the break in all its series
due to the reuniﬁcation. Thus, the high-quality sample is a nearly balanced
panel.
The Data Appendix (available on this journal’s web site) provides a com-
plete description of the data and their sources. Here we illustrate the main
features of our dataset. All our data on government expenditure and rev-
enues come from the OECD Economic Outlook dataset.21 According to in-
ternational guidelines on national income accounting followed by the OECD,
government spending on goods and services is divided into current spending
(i.e., government consumption) and capital spending (i.e., government in-
vestment). Hence, following the OECD classiﬁcation, we measure the wage
component of government spending on goods and services (WGS) as the wage
19In general, the impact of a smaller φ on the transmission of ﬁscal shocks is ambiguous.
To see why, compare two economies, the ﬁrst with φ =1and the second with φ < 1.
We have seen that, when Lg increases, the real wage ω remains constant in the ﬁrst and
increases in the second economy; in addition, φ < 1 implies that labor demand is less
elastic, hence a given increase in Lg causes W/S to increase more in the second. Hence,
it cannot be established a priori in which of the two economies P∗increases more. As a
consequence, we also do not know whether employment and output increase more when
φ =1or when φ < 1.
20The countries in the high-quality sample are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom,
and USA. In our robustness analysis, we also add Austria, Ireland and Spain, whose data
come from diﬀerent sources than the one we use for the high quality sample: see the web
appendix for details and results.
21For some country-years - particularly in the 1960s - this source has been supplemented
with the OECD National Income Accounts database. The deﬁnitions and structure of
this dataset are identical to those of the Economic Outlook; hence, the ﬁscal data are
consistently deﬁned both over time and across countries.
17component of government consumption; we measure the non-wage compo-
nent of spending on goods and services (NWGS) as the sum of the non-wage
component of government consumption and of government capital expendi-
ture. Our measure of labor taxation (LTAX) consists of the sum of social
security taxes (SSRG) and of direct taxes on households (TYH), also from
the Economic Outlook.22
To ensure that movements in taxes are not just a reﬂection of cyclical
ﬂuctuations in the economy, we cyclically adjust labor taxes. We follow the
methodology suggested by Blanchard (1993), consisting in evaluating this
year’s taxes at last year’s output; to do this, we use real output elasticities
of labor taxes provided by OECD in Giorno et al. (1995).23
In the model, we focused on ﬁve key variables: employment, output,
the real product wage, the exchange rate and proﬁtability, all in the traded
sector. We take the traded sector to be the manufacturing sector, a common
and reasonable assumption that maximizes the availability of data and their
comparability across countries. In fact, for all fourteen countries in our high-
quality sample, the four variables above can be constructed from the OECD
Intersectoral Database as follows:24
Employment (L): dependent employment (= number of employees) in man-
ufacturing;
Output (Y ): real value added in manufacturing;
22Direct taxes on households also includes some direct taxes that do not fall on income,
like certain property taxes. However, the breakdown between income and non-income
direct taxes is not always available; we have chosen to use the Economic Outlook measure
to ensure comparability across countries and over time.
23These elasticities start in 1978, and are updated at about 3 year intervals. For the
years before 1978, we use the 1978 elasticity. This is likely to be a rather innocuous
approximation, because within each country these elasticties change minimally over time,
a n di na n yc a s et h ep e r i o do fs u b s t a n t i a lt a xr e f o r m si sg e n e r a l l yt h e1980s.
24For a few country-years, especially at the beginning of the sample, we supplement the
OECD Intersectoral Database with other sources: the International Labor Oﬃce Yearbook
of Labor Statistics for manufacturing employment, the OECD Economic Outlook for unit
labor costs in manufacturing, and the OECD National Income Accounts for value added
in manufacturing. These are also the sources we use for Austria and Spain. For Ireland,
we also use data provided directly to us by that country’s Central Statistical Oﬃce. Note
that, except for the employment data at the beginning of the sample in a few countries,
all our data come from OECD sources, which ensures a good comparability of the series.
In fact, when the same series is available both from, say, the Intersectoral Database and
the National Income Accounts, they are always virtually identical.
18Real product wage (ω): nominal compensation per employee / value added
deﬂator in manufacturing;
Exchange Rate (S = ER): nominal eﬀective exchange rate;
Proﬁtability (π): value added deﬂator in manufacturing / unit labor costs
in manufacturing;
where unit labor costs are deﬁned as total nominal compensation of employees
divided by real value added. Thus, π is equal to the inverse of the share of
labor in manufacturing value added.
We allow for diﬀerent responses to ﬁscal policy across exchange rate
regimes by interacting each ﬁscal policy variable with the indicator variables
P and F, which stand for pegged and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes respec-
tively. We divide our sample period into pegged and ﬂexible exchange rate
r e g i m e sa sf o l l o w s . 25 For all countries, the period 1963-1972 is considered
pegged.26 The subsequent period is considered ﬂexible, except for the 1979-
1993 period for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands,
w h i c hi sc o n s i d e r e dp e g g e d .I t a l yi sc o n s i d e r e dp e g g e df r o m1979 until 1992,
and ﬂexible afterwards as a consequence of Italy’s exit from the ERM in
September of 1992. Great Britain is considered ﬁxed in 1990-91,a n dﬂexible
afterwards, also because of the events following the September 1992 crisis.
We recognize that this classiﬁcation is necessarily subjective: for instance,
one could argue that Italy’s position after 1992 is closer to a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime than to a pegged exchange rate regime. However, our results are
not sensitive to alternative classiﬁcations of these borderline cases.27 We end
25S i n c ew ed e s i r ea0 - 1 dummy variable, some judgement is required in allocating the
intermediate cases between pure ﬁxes and pure ﬂoats. The IMF classiﬁcation of exchange
rate regimes, based on self-reporting by countries, contains several such intermediate cases
and so does not neatly deliver a 0-1 categorisation. For this reason, some judgement calls
are required. An alternative approach would be to classify exchange rate regimes according
to the observed degree of exchange rate volatility but this is problematic for several reasons.
First, the actual level of volatility depends on the volatility of the underlying shocks.
Second, such a procedure would make OLS estimates inconsistent, since the exchange rate
regime would be deﬁned on the basis of the values of the dependent variable in an exchange
rate equation.
26The exceptions are Canada, that ﬂoated its currency in 1970, and Germany and the
Netherlands, that ﬂoated in 1971.
27Of the three countries that are not part of our high-quality sample, we classify Austria
a sb e l o n g i n gt oaﬁxed exchange rate regime during the whole period, on the grounds that
19up with about an equal number years in the two regimes; 208 in the ﬂexible
exchange rate regime, 200 in the pegged exchange rate regime, for a total of
408 observations. When Austria, Ireland and Spain are included, the total
number of observations increases to 488, with 232 in the ﬂexible exchange
rate regime and 256 in a peg.
We recognize that the possibility of realignments within the European
Monetary System makes it a mixed system. Particularly at the beginning
of the period, the frequent number of realignments may have made it closer
to a ﬂexible than to a pegged exchange rate regime. In the empirical part,
we allow for a diﬀerence between years with and without realignments. As
it turns out, our results are not sensitive to the treatment of realignments
within the EMS.28 Although selection bias is always a potential problem when
using exchange rate regime classiﬁcations, we are quite conﬁdent that in our
case the results are not sensitive to selection bias in the choice of exchange
rate regime. Recall that what we are estimating is the eﬀect of a change in
ﬁscal policy in year t on manufacturing performance in year t, conditional
o nt h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei np l a c ei ny e a rt .I nt h eO E C D ,t h ep e r s i s t e n t
ﬂoaters (eg US or Japan) have a strong commitment to ﬂoating (e.g. due
to country size and a desire for policy autonomy), which is unlikely to be
much inﬂuenced by the current state of the manufacturing sector in the same
year. Similarly, the peggers (mostly European countries) were pegged either
for political reasons (e.g. a multilateral peg system within the European
Union) and/or due to optimum currency area reasons (e.g. Austria pegging
to Germany). The trend shift from pegging to ﬂoating in the early 1970s had
several causes but the state of the manufacturing sector does not rank high
in that list.
Finally, in addition to the ﬁscal variables, we include a proxy for the level
of external demand as an additional control variable. This is to ensure that
any ﬁscal eﬀects are not just reﬂecting a correlation between ﬁscal policy and
the shilling has always been pegged to the D-mark, and exports to Germany account for
more than 50 percent of all Austrian exports during this period. As in previous cases,
our results are robust to alternative assumptions and do not change substantially if the
1973-1979 or the 1973-1990 periods for Austria are considered ﬂexible. Ireland is treated
like other members of the ERM and EMS: pegged until 1972, then ﬂexible until 1978, then
pegged again. Spain is considered pegged from 1990 on.
28The Bretton Woods system also witnessed some realignments: France devalued in
1969, the U.K. and Ireland in 1967; Germany and the Netherlands revalued in 1969. We
deal with these realignments as we do with the much more frequent EMS realignments.
20international economic conditions.
Accordingly, our estimation framework is given by
∆Xit = P ∗ αi + F ∗ αi + P ∗ φt + F ∗ φt +
P ∗ ∆Git ∗ β
0
P + F ∗ ∆Git ∗ β
0
F + P ∗ ∆WYit + (19)
F ∗ ∆WYit + P ∗ Zit ∗ θ
0
P + F ∗ Zit ∗ θ
0
F + ²it
where Xit is the macroeconomic variable of interest, αi and φt are country
and time ﬁxed eﬀects, and Git is a row vector of ﬁscal policy variables which
include the logs of wage government spending on goods and services, non-
wage government spending on goods and services, and labor taxes.29 WY it is
a weighted average of the log of the real GDP of all trading partners of each
country, using trade weights.30 Zit is a row vector of other controls, which
includes a dummy variable for realignments, and a dummy variable for the
1974-75 oil shock, both interacted with the exchange rate regime dummies
and with the ﬁscal policy variables.
All ﬁscal variables are expressed in real, per capita terms using the GDP
deﬂator. All variables are then log-diﬀerenced. Note that the regime eﬀect
is operative only in the presence of unexpected changes in ﬁscal variables: if
all movements in ﬁscal variables were perfectly predicted, the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy would be the same in the two regimes. In our benchmark results, we
do not attempt to separate the expected from the unexpected component of
ﬁscal policy movements, a procedure that is always highly sensitive to the
methodology adopted. In eﬀect, we make the plausible assumption that on
average changes in ﬁscal policy have an unanticipated component. For each
variable, we ran the Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test, allowing for a time
trend and for 0, 1, 2 or 3 lags in the underlying ADF regressions. In no case
could we reject the null of a unit root.31
29Allowing for country-speciﬁc intercepts is less restrictive than imposing a common
intercept – there is no reason to believe manufacturing sectors in diﬀerent countries
experience identical drift growth rates in output, unit labor costs, proﬁtability and real
wages.
30T h eq u e s t i o na r i s e so ft h ee n d o g e n e i t yo fWY.However, in all our regressions we have
year dummies, which capture the common demand and supply shocks. Thus, WY largely
captures external (to the country) demand shocks that are orthogonal to the demand
shocks caused by ﬁscal policy and to the common shocks.
31Note that the test-statistics we use to implement the Im-Pesaran-Wu test, z1NT in
their notation, does not require a balanced panel (see Im, Pesaran and Wu (1995)). In
any case, our panel is minimally unbalanced. Given the values of the test statistics, this
clearly makes no diﬀerence for the results.
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5.1 Quantity variables
Table 1 illustrates the response to ﬁscal policy changes of the two quantity
variables in our model, output (column 1) and employment (column 2), and
of their ratio (column 3). We include only those country-years that have
data available for all the variables. Hence, the sample is exactly the same in
all regressions in Tables 1 a n d2 ,a n ds i n c ea l lv a r i a b l e sa r ee x p r e s s e di nl o g
diﬀerences, the coeﬃcients in column 3 are identically equal to the diﬀerence
between the coeﬃcients in column 2 and 1. All regressions of Tables 1 and 2
are based on the high-quality sample of 14c o u n t r i e s .
As discussed in section 3.3, we expect a negative relationship between
wage government spending, WGS, or labor taxation, LTAX, on one hand,
and employment or output in the manufacturing sector on the other: as
WGS or LTAX increase, the pre-tax wage increases, and employment and
output fall. We also expect smaller negative eﬀects of changes in non-wage
government spending on goods and services, NWGS, on employment or
output. We also expect a positive eﬀect of WY on employment, value added,
and proﬁtability in manufacturing.
From columns (1)a n d( 2 )i nT a b l e1, the point estimates indicate that
manufacturing value added and employment falls in response to an increase
in WGS. However, the estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. The fact
that there is no diﬀerence in quantity responses across regimes is consistent
with our model: since quantities depend on the response of the ﬂexible sectors
that do not suﬀer from nominal rigidities, in our model there is also no regime
eﬀect on quantities.32 Note that the point estimates for NWGShas a positive
or at least much smaller negative impact on output and employment than
WGS, and very little eﬀe c to ne m p l o y m e n t ,a l lo fw h i c hi sa l s oc o n s i s t e n t
with our model.
Regarding the estimated eﬀects of LTAX,w ed oo b s e r v ean e g a t i v er e -
sponse of output to an increase in labor taxation but the employment co-
32If ﬂexible-price ﬁrms faced average wages rather than the ﬂexible wage, then a regime
eﬀect on quantities should exist since partial nominal wage stickiness means that average
real wages are aﬀe c t e db yt h ee x c h a n g er a t e( s e ee q u a t i o n( 16)). However, even in that
case, a lack of a regime eﬀect on quantities could still be rationalized if, for some reason,
ﬁrms are reluctant to pass through the eﬀect of exchange rate ﬂuctuations into export
prices.
22eﬃcients are small and statistically insigniﬁcant. These responses may be
understated if our labor tax measure remains inadequately purged of its
cyclical component. We cyclically adjust taxes with respect to changes of
output; thus, any positive change in employment holding constant output
will have a positive eﬀect on taxes and employment, inducing a positive cor-
relation between the two. For this reason, a proper cyclical adjustment is
particularly important in the employment regressions, because labor taxes
are a direct function of employment.
Column (3) of Table 1 displays the regression for the labor-output ratio.
By construction, its coeﬃcients are equal to the diﬀerence between the co-
eﬃcients in columns (2) and (1). Because the coeﬃcients of WGS in the
output and employment regressions were small to start with, and with the
same sign, they are even smaller and insigniﬁcant in column (3). Af o r t i o r i ,
the same conclusion applies to NWGS. However, we do observe a positive ef-
fect of LTAX on the labor-output ratio. Recall that, under constant returns
to scale, all these ﬁscal variables should have no eﬀect on the labor-output
ratio. As was pointed out in section 2, a positive point estimate could be
rationalized for instance by a model with increasing returns to scale due to
the presence of a ﬁxed labor requirement or by labor hoarding.
Finally, we note that the external demand proxy WY works in the ex-
pected direction: an increase in WY raises domestic output and employment,
although the former eﬀect is not signiﬁcant under pegged exchange rates.
Although the qualitative responses in Table 1 are broadly in line with
our theoretical approach, the estimated coeﬃcient magnitudes are small and
typically insigniﬁcant. We turn next to an investigation of the responses of
wages, proﬁts and the exchange rate.
5.2 “Price” variables
Table 2 displays the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the main “price” variables of
the model, namely the real product wage, proﬁtability, and the nominal ef-
fective exchange rate. Here the eﬀects are substantial, and all in the direction
predicted by our model.
Column (1) displays the real product wage regressions.33 As discussed in
section 3.3, we expect WGS and LTAX to have a positive coeﬃcient in
33Recall that the real product wage is just the inverse of the markup, so that these
regressions can equivalently be interpreted as markup equations.
23t h er e a lp r o d u c tw a g er e g r e s s i o n ;w ea l s oe x p e c tt h ee ﬀects of WGS to be
stronger in a ﬂex, and the eﬀects of LTAX to be stronger in a peg. In fact,
for the real wage equation in column (1), WGS has coeﬃcients of .03 in a
p e ga n d. 3 6i naﬂex, with the diﬀerence signiﬁcant at the 4% level.
Also consistent with the theory, LTAX has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the real product wage under a peg, and the point estimate for this
eﬀect is much stronger than in a ﬂex: the estimated coeﬃcients are .13a n d
-.01, respectively, with a p-value from an F-test on their diﬀerence of .13.
From its deﬁnition, the log change in proﬁtability, as measured by the
ratio of output price to unit labor costs, is identically equal to the log change
in the employment-output ratio (column (3) of Table 1) less the log change
in the real product wage (column (1) of Table 2)). Column (2) of Table 2
reports the benchmark proﬁtability regression. As discussed in section 3.3,
we expect an increase in WGS to have a more negative eﬀect on proﬁtability
under ﬂexible exchange rates via the nominal appreciation that it induces.
Conversely, an increase in LTAX will have a less negative eﬀect on prof-
itability under ﬂexible exchange rates, as the contractionary eﬀect of labor
taxation should generate a nominal depreciation.
Consistent with our model, an increase in WGS is associated with lower
proﬁtability, and the coeﬃcient of WGS is signiﬁcantly larger in absolute
value in the ﬂexible exchange rate regime: the estimated elasticities of prof-
itability to WGS are -.03 and -.48 in a peg and in a ﬂex, respectively, and
are statistically diﬀerent from each other at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient of
WGS in a ﬂex is quantitatively signiﬁcant: when WGS increases by one
average standard deviation, proﬁtability in the ﬂexible exchange rate regime
falls by 20 percent (or 286 percent of its average standard deviation). Also,
the eﬀect on proﬁtability works mostly through the real product wage, be-
cause as shown in Table 1 the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on the labor-output ratio
is limited.34
The point estimates of the eﬀects of LTAX are also consistently negative,
and much larger in absolute value in the peg than in a ﬂex: -.22 against -.09,
and signiﬁcant only in the ﬁrst case. An F-test on the diﬀerence between
between the two coeﬃcient gives a p-value of .15.
Our model predicts that, with sticky prices, the regime eﬀect in proﬁtabil-
ity arises from the eﬀects of ﬁscal variables on the nominal exchange rate.
34The insigniﬁcant eﬀects on L/Y suggest that increasing returns or labor hoarding are
not too important.
24Column 3 of Table 2 displays a regression of the nominal eﬀective exchange
rate ER on our ﬁscal variables.35 In a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, an
increase in WGS does induce a considerable and statistically signiﬁcant ap-
preciation of the nominal eﬀective exchange rate; the F-test of the diﬀerence
of the coeﬃcient of WGS in the two regimes has a p-value of .03. Also con-
s i s t e n tw i t ho u rt h e o r y ,a ni n c r e a s ei nLTAX does induce a depreciation in a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime; however, the coeﬃcient is small, and insigniﬁ-
c a n t .S i n c et h ee x c h a n g er a t ee ﬀect of LTAX depends on its impact on the
level of output, this small implied output eﬀect helps to explain the weaker
eﬀects of LTAX than of WGS in the proﬁtability regressions. In turn, a
small output eﬀect can be rationalized by a low degree of pass-through from
wages to prices (φ and λ small) and/or a small response of wages to tax
changes.36
The key message of Table 2 is that wage government spending has a pow-
erful negative eﬀect on proﬁtability, and a much stronger one in a ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime because of the appreciation it induces, with p-values from
a T-test on the diﬀerence far below .05. Labor taxation also has a negative
eﬀect on proﬁtability via its positive impact on the real wage, and stronger
in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. However, the p-values are marginally out-
side conventional signiﬁcance levels. Moreover, the estimated eﬀects of labor
taxation are smaller than those of wage government spending: the coeﬃcient
of LTAX in a peg is about half that of WGS in a ﬂex.
We have found evidence in Tables 1 and 2 of weak output and employment
eﬀects in the traded sector but a larger impact on real product wages and
proﬁtability. Moreover, there is evidence of diﬀerence across exchange rate
regimes in the transmission of WGS to the “price” variables. As stated
earlier, our model predicts no regime eﬀect in quantities but a regime eﬀect
in prices. The larger impact on prices than on quantities (in both regimes)
can be rationalised by a high degree of nominal rigidity and/or a reluctance
by ﬁr m st op a s so nc o s ti n c r e a s e st oﬁnal customers.
Finally, in the web appendix, we show that these results are generally
robust along several dimensions: rescaling the ﬁscal variables; focusing on
35We construct the nominal eﬀective exchange rate for country i as a trade-weighted
average of the nominal exchange rates with the other countries in the sample, with the
weight of country j equal to the share of exports from country i to country j in total
exports from country i. An increase in the nominal eﬀective exchange rate represents a
depreciation.
36In the model, we assumed labor supply depended on the after-tax real wage.
25the unanticipated component of ﬁscal policy; adding extra countries; and
diﬀerentiating between small and large countries.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have emphasized the short-run macroeconomic eﬀects of
diﬀerent types of ﬁscal policy. We distinguished between two transmission
mechanisms: a cost channel and an exchange rate channel. For both eﬀects to
be operative, wages and prices must display partial ﬂexibility with respect to
ﬁscal policy. If wages and prices are fully ﬂexible, the exchange rate channel
is inoperative; if wages and prices are fully rigid, there are no short-run cost
eﬀects from ﬁscal policy.
On a panel of OECD countries from 1964 to 1993, we found that increases
in wage government spending raise the real product wage and depress prof-
itability in the traded sector. These results indicate the operation of a signif-
icant cost channel in the transmission of ﬁscal policy. Moreover, the positive
impact on the real product wage and the negative impact on proﬁtability
are signiﬁcantly larger under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, consistent with
the presence of an exchange rate channel. That both the cost and the ex-
change rate channels are active suggests that partial ﬂexibility in wages and
prices is a good description of the nature of adjustment to ﬁscal shocks in the
economies we study in this paper. That ﬁscal policy has a smaller impact on
quantities than on the real product wage and proﬁtability suggests that the
pass-through of higher costs into prices is limited, either because prices are
largely sticky or it is not optimal for ﬁrms to maintain a constant markup in
t h ef a c eo fc o s ti n c r e a s e s .
The weaker results for taxation may be partly attributable to measure-
ment problems. However, since tax policy only inﬂuences the exchange rate
via its impact on the level of private sector output, the small quantity re-
sponses we observe also imply small eﬀects on the exchange rate and small
diﬀerences across exchange rate regimes. Understanding better the impact
of tax policy on exchange rates represents a challenge for future research. In
line with our theoretical prior, non-wage government spending on goods and
services has only minor eﬀects on the traded sector.
Thus, this paper has provided evidence that the composition of a shift
in ﬁscal policy is important in determining its impact on the traded sector.
This is relevant in the design of ﬁscal adjustment programs. A ﬁscal reform
26that takes the form of a reduction in wage government spending will crowd
in an expansion in traded output and employment and improve the level of
proﬁtability. A reform that consists of an increase in labor taxation will have
t h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect on the traded sector.
A second message is that the choice of the exchange rate regime matters
for the impact of ﬁscal reforms on key macroeconomic variables. For instance,
under ﬂexible exchange rates, a reduction in wage government spending dou-
bly improves proﬁtability in the traded sector: not only do labor costs fall
but ﬁrms in the traded sector also beneﬁt from the induced exchange rate
depreciation.
Our study has focused on the impact of ﬁscal policy on the tradable sector
of the economy. The tradable sector is especially interesting, since we have
shown that domestic ﬁscal policy can importantly inﬂuence an economy’s in-
ternational competitiveness, by altering unit labor costs and proﬁtability. In
future work, it would be interesting to also examine the impact of ﬁscal policy
on the private nontradable sector, under alternative exchange rate regimes,
in order to gain a sense of its overall impact on aggregate macroeconomic
indicators. The relative importance of the two sectors will obviously vary in
line with country size, with our results for the tradable sector being most
critical for the smaller, more open economies.
27Technical Appendix
In this section, we prove that an expansion in Lg causes GDP to rise and
hence the exchange rate to appreciate.














Since G1 < 0, this expression has an ambiguous sign. Manipulation delivers
the following condition for the derivative to be positive
²W/S,Lg <
Lg
²P∗,W/Sκ0L(²Y,P∗ − 1) − Lg
(.2)
where κ0 is the markup in the full ﬂexibility case, ²W/S,Lg is the elasticity
of the real wage with respect to government employment, ²P∗,W/S is the
elasticity of the price to the real wage, and ²Y,P∗ is the price elasticity of
output demand (signed to be positive).







)] + Lg (.3)





(1 − τ)F1 − G1H1
(.4)
Since F1,H1 > 0 and G1 < 0, we know the impact of an increase in Lg will









Hence, the elasticity of the real wage with respect to Lg depends positively
on the relative size of the government sector Lg/L and negatively on the
elasticities of labor supply and labor demand. The elasticity of labor demand
28in our setup is the product of (i) the price elasticity of output demand, ²Y,P∗,
and (ii) the elasticity of price with respect to the real wage, ²P∗,W/S.
In the monopolistic competition case, the latter is 1 and the former is θ.















Using (.6), it is easy to show that (.7) is always satisﬁed in the monopo-
listic competition case, because it reduces to the condition (θ−λ) < (θ+²Ls)
where λ = Lg/L. A fortiori, the condition is satisﬁed under market struc-
tures in which wage increases are not fully passed through to prices, since the
rising real wage does not prompt as a big fall in output and labor demand
in the traded sector.
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32Table 1: Quantities
dep. var. Y L L/Y
(1)( 2 ) ( 3 )
PWGS -0.02 -0.02 -0.00
(0.15) (0.22) (0.02)
FWGS —0.15 -0.03 0.12
(1.36) (0.31)( 1.28)
PNWGS 0.06 0.08 0.02
(1.19) (2.05) (0.50)
FNWGS -0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.12) (0.38) (0.49)
PLTAX -0.08 0.02 0.10
(1.27) (0.45) (1.87)
FLTAX -0.13 -0.04 0.09
(2.25) (0.77) (1.89)
PWY 0.43 0.87 0.45
(0.68) (1.75) (0.82)
FWY 1.32 0.64 -0.67
(2.66) (1.64) (1.57)
R2 0.58 0.42 0.44
Nobs 408 408 408
DoF 3193 193 19
p(WGS) 0.38 0.94 0.35
p(NWGS) 0.41 0.34 0.94
p(LTAX) 0.54 0.39 0.95
P: dummy variable for pegged exchange rate
regime; F: dummy variable for ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime. All regressions also in-
clude dummy variable for realignments and
for the 1974-75 oil shock, all also interacted
with the ﬁscal policy variables. p(X): p-value
from F test that coeﬃcient on PX and FX are
the same.
33Table 2: Prices
dep. var. ωπ ER
(1)( 2 ) ( 3 )
PWGS 0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.28) (0.25) (0.10)
FWGS 0.36 -0.48 -0.58
(3.12) (3.92) (3.12)
PNWGS 0.03 -0.05 0.05
(0.54) (0.89) (0.67)
FNWGS 0.01 -0.04 0.01
(0.19) (0.56) (0.10)
PLTAX 0.12 -0.22 -0.04
(1.93) (3.26) (0.43)
FLTAX -0.01 -0.09 0.08
(0.15) (1.33) (0.81)
PWY -0.31 -0.14- 0 . 4 6
(0.47) (0.19) (0.43)
FWY 0.190 . 4 8 - 0 . 5 6
(0.37) (0.87) (0.67)
R2 0.36 0.29 0.22
Nobs 408 408 408
DoF 3193 193 19
p(WGS) 0.04 0.01 0.03
p(NWGS) 0.86 0.91 0.74
p(LTAX) 0.130 . 150 . 3 9
See Table 1.
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